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This paper provides an overview of privatization and 
competition in the water industry from a public policy 
vantage point.  In particular, it contrasts the contract 
operations model with the private ownership with 
regulation model.  Advantages and disadvantages of 
each model are summarized.  The monopolistic nature 
of the water industry and the potential need for 
structured competition and economic regulation are 
discussed. 
 
STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 
 
The U.S. water industry is dominated by public 
ownership.  Publicly owned systems (municipalities, 
counties, districts, and authorities) account for about 43 
percent of all community water systems, but about 85 
percent of population served, water sales, and revenues 
from sales (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
1997).  Many of the nation’s numerous small utilities 
are privately owned, but several large investor-owned 
utilities have a presence in the industry’s composition.  
The state public utility commissions regulate only about 
20 percent of all community water systems (Beecher, 
1995). 
 
The water industry has and will continue to display 
many characteristics of monopoly.  Nonetheless, the 
water industry in the 1990s has felt the forces of 
competition.  Water utilities are competing with 
themselves and with others in a number of venues, 
including:  extending service to unserved or 
underserved areas; engaging in acquisitions and mergers 
(voluntary); bidding for operations contracts; bypassing 
the utility (including self-supply); purchasing water on 
wholesale markets; trading water rights (alternative 
uses); maintaining a service and quality image (bottled 
water); promoting public versus private ownership; 
contesting markets, ownership, takeovers; and 
participating in convergence acquisitions. 
 
The expanding number of competitors in the water 
industry includes investor-owned water utilities, 
municipal water utilities, nonutility contract operations 
firms, energy holding companies, and foreign 
multinational corporations.  Some of the newer entrants 
to the competition have strong global presence and 
resources that far outweigh those of even the largest 
U.S. water utilities. 
 
An intense and meaningful form of competition (a better 
term might be “contestability”) is the competition 
between public and private ownership.  As pressure on 
the water industry rises, alternative ownership forms – 
both public and private – are explored.  In some cases, 
the “grass looks greener” on the other side of the fence.  
A city that owns its system explores privatization; a city 
served by an investor-owned utility considers its rights 
of eminent domain. In practice, good and bad 
performers can be found on both sides of the 
privatization fence.  As emphasized by Charles Wolf, 
the choice between public and private is a choice 
between imperfect alternatives.1   
 
Competition and privatization are linked but they are 
not identical, despite the frequent commingling of the 
concepts. Privatization in itself does not equal or ensure 






The privatization debate certainly has a basis in 
philosophical discourse.  E.S. Savas (1987) describes 
four sources of support for privatization: ideological, 
populist, pragmatic, and commercial.   Ideologues want 
less government, populists want a better society, 
pragmatists want effective solutions, and commercial 
interests want more business.   
 
This typology can be used to describe how the U.S. 
privatization movement is affecting the water industry.  
The populist sentiment seems to play a less important 
role than ideology, which also seems to be only 
moderately relevant (despite the abundant rhetoric 
surrounding privatization).  Pragmatism – the need to 
solve problems – seems to be a very important factor in 
privatization.  Even more important is the apparent role 
of commercialism.  Utilities, contractors, the contract 
advisors, think tanks, and members of the trade press 
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have played a very active part in promoting 
privatization, often to the exclusion of competing 
perspectives.  Privatization is considered good for 
business (including ancillary businesses), so the 
commercial interest in privatization should come as no 
surprise. 
 
A central philosophical issue for government 
policymakers is whether or not the ownership and/or 
operation of water systems are “core” government 
functions.  Ideas about government’s core functions are 
value-based and very personal.  Most people agree that 
judicial and policing functions are core functions.  
Regulation (including the economic, environmental, and 
social varieties) also is usually considered core.  But 
opinions differ about road repairs, refuse collection, and 
schools.  And of water service – is it “public works” or 
a utility business?   
 
Privatization advocates tend to see only a few 
governmental functions as core; many of the functions 
performed by government are ripe for private 
involvement.  Skeptics see more functions as core and 
worry about the delegation of power and authority and 
the potential loss of accountability, as well as the 
additional burdens that privatization actually places on 
government (Kettl, 1993).  
 
Several pragmatic reasons for privatization were 
identified in a recent study (Beecher, et al., 1995).  
Based on thirty nonrandom case studies, the following 
arguments were cited:  funding needed for capital 
improvements (17 mentions); environmental 
compliance issues (17); source-of-supply or capacity 
limitations (11); wanted expert water management (7); 
potential to lower construction costs (6); potential to 
lower operating costs (5); opportunity costs associated 
with municipal funding (5); potential to increase system 
efficiency (3); local labor issues or disputes (2); wanted 
out of the water/wastewater business (2); and potential 
to increase cash flows (2). 
 
Other studies have provided insight as to why some 
cities have rejected privatization (Johnson and Heilman, 
1987).  These include economics (high costs and rates, 
minimal cost savings, and disagreement over terms); 
politics (loss of municipal control over facilities, 
employees, and rates); legal issues (unwillingness of the 
privatizer to guarantee a proposal due to tax law 
uncertainties); and other reasons (including objections 
to buy-back provisions, risk of default, and difficulties 
with contractors). 
 
Although it does not appear to have been studied 
systematically, some cities also are choosing 
“municipalization.”  The key reasons seem to be: 
concerns about high water rates and desire to control 
rates and rate design, desire for control over local water 
resources, interest in achieving tax and financing 
advantages, interest in reducing or “keeping” the profit 
to spend elsewhere, and – somewhat amazingly – an 
interest in shifting from ownership to contract model of 
privatization. 
 
While there exist many valid reasons for privatization, it 
may be worth calling attention to a few invalid reasons.  
These reasons may explain why privatization often is 
viewed as a threat.  First, privatization should not be 
implemented out of fear, intimidation, corruption, or a 
false sense of urgency (“now or never”).  Second, cities 
should avoid cashing in for a one-time monetary 
windfall without vision or purpose about the long-term 
interest of the community.  Finally, privatization should 
be viewed as a means to achieving other goals, not as an 
end unto itself.  In other words, pure rhetoric or 
ideology does not seem to provide a solid foundation for 
the privatization decision.   
 
PRIVATIZATION AND PERFORMANCE 
 
Several hypotheses favoring privatization have been 
advanced in the literature, although they are expressed 
more informally than formally.  Most can be supported 
through anecdotal evidence, but few have been 
subjected to rigorous empirical examination. 
  
 
The prevailing hypotheses suggest that, compared to 
privately managed utilities, publicly managed utilities:  
experience more construction-cost overruns; postpone 
necessary improvements; overcapitalize (even more 
than private utilities); overutilize debt; incur higher 
capital and operating costs; are less efficient in 
procurement and scheduling; innovate slowly if at all; 
provide longer tenure to managers; have greater debt 
capacity and access to capital; are more risky and 
realize lower returns; subsidize or receive subsidies 
from other local government operations; set rates further 
from costs (and marginal costs); and favor voters over 
nonvoter, businesses over individual consumers, and 
organized groups over unorganized groups (Beecher, et 
al., 1995). 
 
While overgeneralization (common to this literature) 
should be avoided, the theories behind privatization 
actually suggest that ownership may be less important 
than competition (or regulation) in achieving 
performance gains, and that efficiency practices and 
economies of scale are most important (Donahue, 
1989).  The implication is that many of the apparent 
deficits of public ownership can be overcome, at least in 
part, through various means. 
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Nonetheless, privatization can be advantageous. It 
complements the forces of competition and 
contestability that have emerged in the industry.  It can 
bring a much-needed influx of private resources to an 
industry facing substantial capital and operating costs.  
It can introduce a profit motive to the achievement of 
goals (including societal goals).  It can promote 
operational efficiency, particularly in the areas of labor, 
energy, and treatment chemicals.  It can encourage 
innovation in management.   It can contribute to the 
professionalization of the labor force. 
 
TWO MODELS OF PRIVATIZATION 
 
The U.S. privatization experience provides two sharply 
contrasting models and yet another form of competition.  
The “contracts” model involves public ownership with 
“delegated” management, a generally limited use of 
private capital for major projects, and intense 
competition for contracts.  Under the contracts model, 
public ownership and the competitive market 
“substitute” for economic regulation.  In fact, the states 
provide little regulatory oversight of contract 
agreements.   
 
The “ownership” model consists of investor ownership, 
use of private capital for major projects, and limited 
(and highly structured) competition.  Investor-owned 
water utilities are subject to the jurisdiction of the state 
public utility commissions, which approve territories 
and terms of service, investments, expenditures, prices, 





The contracts model is receiving considerable attention, 
even though some contracting activity has always 
occurred.  The model has many variations, with various 
types and degrees of private-sector involvement.2  
Contracting has gained considerable ground in the 
wastewater sector but is gaining interest in the water 
sector as well.  Recent tax policy changes have 
stimulated contract activity but many institutional and 
political barriers remain.   
 
The leading contract firms in the United States include: 
United Water Services (Lyonnaise des Eaux), American 
Commonwealth, Environmental Management, 
Professional Services Group, U.S. Filter, U.S. Water 
LLC, Earth Tech, OMI/CH2M Hill, Severn Trent 
Environmental, and Vivendi (Compagnie Générale des 
Eaux).  The recent merger trend continues to narrow the 
list and further concentrate market power.  Participating 
actively in the contract process is a select group of firms 
that advise cities about how to privatize and participate 
actively in the implementation process (for example, in 
proposal and bid design).  They might be considered 
“facilitators” by some, “enablers” by others.  The 
prominent privatization contract advisors include:  
Malcolm Pirnie; CH2M Hill; Camp, Dresser, and 
McKee; Arthur Andersen; and Raftelis Environmental 
Consulting.   
 
By one account, publicly owned systems entered into 
186 contracts with a total value of $19.3 billion during 
the 1985 to 1998 time period (Public Works Financing, 
1998a).  Larger contracts in force for various aspects of 
water operations and management include Atlanta, 
Georgia ($260 mil.); Detroit, Michigan ($260 mil.); 
Camden, New Jersey ($200 mil.); Edison, New Jersey 
($120  mil.); and Seattle, Washington ($101 mil.).  
Larger contracts in force for the wastewater industry 
include Cranston, Rhode Island ($400 mil.); Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin ($350 mil.); Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
($250 mil.); Indianapolis, Indiana ($225 mil.); and 
Camden County, New Jersey ($170 mil.). 
 
To be protective of the interests of the principal (the 
contracting local government), the contracting process 
must include several key elements including but not 
limited to: an independent analysis by a qualified 
consultant; a carefully designed competitive bidding 
process, including prequalification of potential bidders; 
a thorough specification of functional roles and 
responsibilities; a statement of liability and risk 
assumption; clear, specific, and measurable 
performance goals; incentive-based compensation 
arrangements based on success in meeting performance 
goals; a plan for public information and involvement; a 
procedure for securing regulatory approvals; a 
performance review and evaluation process; 
mechanisms for major and minor conflict resolution; 
and provisions for termination and transition upon 
completion of the term (Beecher, et al., 1995). 
 
The need for “best practices” in the design and 
implementation of privatization arrangements is great.  
In September 1998, a coalition of privatization interests 
provided a proposed checklist to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, which has asserted 
review authority for long-term concession agreements 
(Public Works Financing, 1998b). 
 
A well designed and carefully implemented contractual 
arrangement can offer several potential advantages over 
the status quo:  efficiency and innovation (demonstrable 
savings) for cities that will not otherwise implement 
these measures or sell their systems; bidding process 
drives down costs; maintains low-cost (subsidized) 
financing options; maintains tax advantages for the 
system; allows a wide range of costing and ratemaking 
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alternatives; creates a mobile professional work force; 
retains local control for development and ratemaking 
purposes (also a disadvantage); fewer barriers to entry 
than private ownership; and may facilitate transition to 
other options (including private ownership). 
 
These advantages are not insignificant.  Indeed, some 
water and wastewater systems have experienced 
demonstrable savings and achievements since initiating 
contract arrangements.  However, the potential 
disadvantages of the contracts model appear to be quite 
numerous:  more emphasis on bidding process than 
long-term accountability; competition is intermittent at 
best; “quiet” (no bid) renewals and sweetheart deals; 
special technical processes may “lock in” a contractor 
with expertise; contracting is oligopolistic at the bidding 
stage because few firms qualify; contracting is 
monopolistic once the contract is awarded, with 
relatively weak competitive pressure over time; 
principal-agent issues, namely whose interests are 
served when responsibilities are “delegated”;3 potential 
for ruinous competition (underbidding); contracting 
obscures responsibility for investment decisions; can 
increase or shift risks to cities; may cause under 
investment in infrastructure; contracting limits infusion 
of private capital; capacity of local government and the 
need to be a “smart buyer”;4 potential need for micro-
management or “micro-oversight” to ensure that 
performance goals are met; politicization of 
decisionmaking (including ratemaking practices); 
downsides of franchise arrangements (cable television, 
for instance); barriers to termination and market exit;5 
bidding presumes maintenance of current prices; 
decoupled costs and prices provides no assurance that 
savings or “profits” will flow to system improvements 
or to ratepayers (often not);6 require “foolproof” 
contracts and crystal-clear performance incentives, and 
meaningful enforcement mechanisms; contracting can 
invite favoritism, waste, fraud, and corruption involving 
public and private partners;7 “best practices” are not 
well established; and spatial and temporal boundaries of 
cities thwart optimal long-term solutions, namely 
regionalization.  A patchwork of private contracts, in 
other words, will not help the water industry achieve 
much needed scale economies through the formation of 
publicly or privately owned regional systems. 
 
The longer the contract, the greater is the opportunity 
for the contractor to produce promised results and avoid 
significant adversities, such as drastic labor cuts.  
Contracts are growing longer in length and more 
lucrative financially, to the obvious benefit of the 
contracting community.  Larger and longer contracts 
reduce risks and enhance profitability, but they have 
other implications as well.  First, they narrow the field 
of viable competitors, resulting in an oligopolistic 
market.  Second, they challenge the capacity of local 
governments to design and oversee contracts to protect 
their interests over the long haul.  Experienced 
contractors generally have the advantage in the 
contracting process.  Third, and perhaps most important, 
they suggest the possibility of monopoly power and 
potential for abuse over time.   
 
The issue of persistent monopoly power is perhaps the 
most important consideration for policymakers.  Fine 
lines and distinctions are drawn between contracts, 
concessions, and franchises.  But in reality, each has 
elements of monopoly power.  A twenty-five year cycle 
of bidding – however intense the bidding – hardly 
constitutes robust competition.8  The competition is 
intermittent at best.  Moreover, the contracts model is 
designed rather transparently to circumvent the 
authority of the state to regulate monopolies and their 
profits.  According to one of the leading contract 
advisors, “A very restrictive feature in many states is the 
inability to remove the privatization transaction from 
the control of the public service commission of that 
state.  As a result, rates of return are strictly monitored.”  





Private ownership is sometimes considered the “pure” 
form of privatization.  Like the contracts model, the 
ownership model has both advantages and 
disadvantages.  Some of the advantages of private 
ownership are based not in private ownership alone but 
in private ownership coupled with regulation of the 
monopoly.  These advantages include:  establishes water 
service as a business, more like other major utilities; 
encourages private investment; more efficient 
procurement practices; allows unbounded regional and 
multisystem solutions (for both water and wastewater 
services); maintains ongoing competitive pressure for 
efficiency via contestability (because of the eminent 
domain powers of cities); pride of ownership (especially 
when employee-owned); establishes long-term 
accountability; less vulnerable to trends and changes in 
local politics; reduces potential for fraud and corruption; 
and regulation can control monopoly abuse, protect 
ratepayers, and provide powerful ongoing performance 
incentives (rate of return). 
 
Private ownership of water systems also demonstrates 
some potentially relevant disadvantages:  for cities, 
asset sales provide a one-time windfall; loss of the 
financing and tax advantages of public and nonprofit 
ownership; prices often increase to cover true costs; can 
shift costs without reducing costs; difficulty in valuation 
of utility property; perceived loss of local control; 
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reliance on regulatory oversight; risk of over investment 
(building the rate base); limits to the traditional 
regulatory model, particularly with regard to certain 
performance incentives; concern about regulatory 
environment; the inability for investor-owned utilities to 
compete because of the lack of a level playing field 
(financing, tax, and other considerations); and the limits 
of contestability to encourage discipline. 
 
In sum, the key advantages of the contract model are 
gains in efficiency and professional expertise, a lower 
cost of capital, and the preservation of local control.  
Key ownership advantages are private investment and 
longevity, opportunities for regionalization, and 




MONOPOLY AND RUINOUS COMPETITION 
 
Privatization raises several key considerations.  One, 
mentioned already, is the monopolistic character of 
water service.  Privatization that creates or maintains 
unrestrained monopoly power is the worst possible 
choice.  As noted by Donahue (1989, p. 78), “Half a 
market system – profit drive without meaningful 
specifications or competitive discipline – can be worse 
than none.”  
 
The term “monopoly” has evolved to have a pejorative 
meaning.  A more neutral understanding is that 
monopoly is simply an efficient means of organizing 
certain economic activities based on the dominant 
characteristic of those activities.9  Water service is 
highly monopolistic and demonstrates many of the 
classic economic features of monopoly:  barriers to 
entry (economic and legal), capital intensity, high fixed 
costs, economies of scale (declining unit costs), 
inefficiency in redundancy (more than one pipe), the 
obligation to provide service on demand, and limited 
opportunities for substitution or choices.10 
 
Some noneconomic rationales for monopoly 
organization of water service also can be provided.  
First, water service is “vested with a public interest” 
because of water’s central role in maintaining life.  
Second, a related point is that water service is essential 
for providing related services that also are essential – 
fire protection and sanitation.  Third, water is an 
environmental resource that is finite and available at 
nature’s convenience. 
 
The persistent power of public monopolies is a concern 
at least as important as the economic power of 
contractors.  In fact, the relationship can be mutually 
exploitive.  Competitive bids and private contracts do 
not alter the basic public monopoly.  Often, local 
control over rates is offered as a justification for local 
independence from regulation.  However, the continued 
decoupling of costs and rates can lead to inefficiency 
and inequity for ratepayers.  Cities may view the water 
system as a potential source of subsidies for other 
programs once savings are achieved.    Significant 
private involvement in a public monopoly raises core 
accountability issues.  Regulation of the ultimate 
monopoly – the city – may be justified by public-
interest considerations. 
 
Another major consideration is the uneven playing field 
for competition, which presents one of the most 
formidable barriers to the efficient restructuring of the 
water industry.  Various public policies contribute to 
this unevenness. 
 
Each of the major players in the water industry 
competition has distinct advantages.  The advantages of 
publicly owned systems are tax exemption, financing, 
subsidies, flexibility in designing rates and charges, 
eminent domain power, and unrestrained marketing 
ability.  Nonprofit systems have tax and financing 
advantages, as well as a possible advantage in terms of 
the ability to promote regionalization.  Given the current 
policy regime, nonprofit systems may be especially 
advantageous.  The chief advantage of contractors is the 
absence of state oversight and profit regulation, and the 
ability to secure long and lucrative agreements.  Energy 
companies and foreign investors have the distinct 
advantage of deep pockets for acquisitions and 
expansion.   Somewhat ironically, investor-owned water 
utilities are the least advantaged in this equation but 
they can boast brand name recognition and longevity in 
the water business.  
 
A related consideration is the potential for “ruinous” 
competition – an old-fashioned but potentially useful 
term in the context of an uneven playing field for 
competition.  Ruinous competition does what it 
suggests: ruin the prospects of an otherwise viable 
participant in the market place.  Potentially ruinous 
competition in the water industry today includes: 
underbidding for contracts (loss leaders), excessive 
bidding and concession fees that distort markets,11 
overpaying for acquisitions, cream skimming of and 
bypass by large-volume customers, underpricing by 
unregulated firms in markets with regulated firms, and 
(perhaps the most serious) persuading cities to condemn 
private utilities and turn the system over to private 
contractors. 
 
The concept of ruinous competition was used to 
rationalize the formulation of economic regulation in 
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the first place and it might be used to rationalize the 
extension of regulatory oversight today:   
 
The emergence of unregulated competition for 
firms that are subject to price regulation can, in 
some circumstances, form the basis for the 
extension of regulation to the new unregulated 
competition in order to permit the original 
regulatory scheme to serve some of its purposes 
effectively.  This extension of regulation to 
protect existing regulation typically occurs in 
one of two situations—when unregulated 
competition threatens to undermine minimum 
price regulation, and when unregulated 
competition threatens to interfere with the 
pursuit of social policies through rate design…  
[U]nregulated competition in the market served 
by the regulated firms constitutes a direct threat 
to the ability of minimum rate regulation to 
protect the revenues and financial condition of 
the regulated firms. (Pierce and Gellhorn, 1994, 
p. 62)  
 
THE ROLE OF REGULATION 
 
Privatization of a monopolistic industry beckons for the 
consideration of economic regulation.  Economic 
 regulation recognizes the monopolistic nature of the 
industry and seeks to balance the interests of producers 
and consumers.  Regulation can address financial 
stability and operational reliability concerns.  
Regulation may be particularly necessary when costs 
are rising and demand is flat, as is the case for the water 
sector.12 Regulation can encourage the application of 
least-cost solutions, including regionalization to achieve 
economies of scale.  The role of regulation and the 
capacity of governing institutions to regulate are paid 
more attention in the context of privatizing global state-
owned enterprises. 
 
The long life of water utility assets and concerns about 
intergenerational equity also may justify regulation.  
Regulation also can address other equity issues that 
arise inevitably in the provision of an essential service, 
including the ability of subpopulations to pay for 
service.   Regulation also can be adapted to different 
types of water and wastewater systems and various 
forms of ownership.  Regulation can be applied to the 
public, nonprofit, and private sectors alike.  Exemptions 
from regulation can be provided under some 
circumstances, while broader regulatory authority is 
maintained.  
 
Economic regulation substitutes for public ownership on 
the one hand and competitive markets on the other.  
When thoughtfully designed and implemented, 
regulation can provide:  a check of monopoly power and 
allowance of reasonable profits (regardless of 
ownership); an independent review of the prudence of 
investments and expenditures and the justness and 
reasonableness of rates; uniformity and openness in 
record keeping and cost accounting; performance 
incentives (cost recovery and rates of return); assurance 
that benefits flow to systems and ratepayers; more 
efficient (that is, cost-based) water prices; an 
expeditious forum for hearing disputes and resolving 
complaints among utilities, contractors, and 
customers;13 a level playing field for structured 
competition; the legitimacy and authority of the state 
and additional safeguards to cities; more regulatory 
capacity than local governments and economies of 
regulation (which frees local resources for other 
pursuits); less need to micromanage utility 
decisionmaking; fewer opportunities for coercion, 
corruption, or politicization; and attention to long-term 
social, environmental issues. 
 
Traditional rate-of-return regulation, despite its 
limitations, provides a powerful system of incentives.  
Regulators provide utilities with an authorized but not a 
guaranteed rate of return.  Under pressure from 
stockholders, utilities must work to achieve their 
authorized return between rate cases.  In fact, most 
regulated systems find it difficult to achieve their 
authorized return, particularly in recent years.  Rate-of-
return incentives can be used to reward systems that 
meet performance goals, including efficiency as well as 
social and environmental goals.  Also, modifications 
and regulatory alternatives (price caps) are emerging to 
address the shortcomings of the traditional regulatory 
model, fine-tune incentives, and provide greater 
flexibility. 
 
The state regulatory “climate” in which investor-owned 
utilities operate plays a salient but little analyzed role in 
the choice between ownership and competition 
(Beecher, et al., 1995).  A level playing field for 
competition would stimulate more ownership.  
Regulation can and should be adapted to meet the 
changing conditions and needs of the private 




Structured competition might be used to combine 
certain elements of competition with the protective 
features of regulation.  Structured competition 
recognizes both the monopolistic character of the water 
industry and the rationale for regulation stemming from 
economic and noneconomic considerations. 
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Although the model must be more fully developed and 
articulated, elements of structured competition might 
include:  uniform record keeping and cost accounting; 
comparability in ratemaking practices, including all 
tariffs and charges; modified or flexible regulation to 
achieve policy goals, including positive performance 
incentives; promotion of wholesale water markets to 
help achieve regionalization; approval of flexible, 
negotiated, or market-based rates, especially under 
competitive circumstances; consistent policy on 
franchises and the exclusivity of service areas; 
allowance of entry into new service markets through 
regulated or unregulated affiliates based on risk 
assessment; profit-sharing for ancillary services 
provided by regulated utilities; [pre]certification of 
privatizers, regulatory review of operations contracts, 
and regulatory dispute resolution between cities and 
contractors; and  uniform regulatory jurisdiction for 
publicly and privately owned utilities and rules to help 
level the playing field for competition. 
 
Designing and implementing a structured competition 
model for the water industry would be a daunting task, 
but the alternative is to continue on the path of 





Privatization raises a number of overarching public 
policy issues that should be debated at the various levels 
of government and within the private sector as well.  
Foremost among these considerations are:  the 
importance of accountability regardless of ownership 
form; the capacity of government to provide regulatory 
oversight and correct market failures14; the 
establishment of best practices for contract 
management; the need for sustained performance 
incentives; the tradeoffs involved in alternative models 
of privatization; the concentration of economic power 
through mergers and acquisitions (utilities and 
contractors); antitrust and related legal concerns; 
globalization and the level of foreign investment in the 
water industry; the delineation of government’s core 
functions (ownership, operation, and/or economic 
regulation); the appropriate roles of the public, 
nonprofit, and private sectors in achieving long-term 
societal goals; the potential for cooperation as well as 
competition; and the effect of various public policies 
and the regulatory climate on privatization choices 
(especially tax, financing, and territorial policies). 
 
The last point cannot be overstated.  Were there a level 
playing field for the competition among ownership and 
operational forms, and were there consistent public 
policies toward the participants in the competition, a 




The private sector can, will, and should play a role in 
the water industry.  However, privatization alone does 
not ensure a competitive market or the discipline that 
competition brings.   Occasional competition does not 
resolve the fundamental issues of monopoly that arise in 
the provision of water services.  However tempting, 
accountability should not be sacrificed at the altar of 
efficiency.  Government should harness the resources 
and innovations of the private sector while recognizing 
the need to oversee a very monopolistic industry that 
also is vested with a public interest. 
 
 
Janice A. Beecher is the principal of Beecher Policy 
Research, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana.  She has a Ph.D. 
in political science from Northwestern University and 
specializes in public policy research related to the 
structure and regulation of the water industry.  This 
paper also was presented at the 1999 Annual 






Beecher, Janice A.  1995.  1995 Inventory of 
Commission-Regulated Water and Wastewater 
Utilities.   Indianapolis: Center for Urban Policy and 
the Environment. 
 
Beecher, Janice A. et al.  1995. Regulatory Implications 
of Water and Wastewater Utility Privatization.  
Columbus, OH: National Regulatory Research 
Institute. 
 
Beecher, Janice A.  1998.  Water Compared: Structural, 
Regulatory, and Strategic Issues for Utilities in a 
Changing Context.  Washington, DC: National 
Association of Water Utilities. 
 
Chessler, David.  1996.  Determining When Competition 
is “Workable”: A Handbook for State Commissions 
Making Assessments Required by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Columbus, OH: 
The National Regulatory Research Institute. 
 
Donahue, John.  1989.  The Privatization Decision.  
New York: Basic Books. 
 
 20 
Johnson, Gerald W., and John G. Heilman.  1987.  
“Metapolicy Transition and Policy Implementation: 
New Federalism and Privatization,” Public 
Administration Review (November/December), pp. 
468-77. 
 
Kettl, Donald F.  1993.  Sharing Power .  Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution. 
 
Kikeri, Sunita, et al.  1992.  Privatization: The Lessons 
of Experience.  Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Pierce, Richard J., Jr. and Ernest Gellhorn.  1994.  
Regulated Industries in a Nutshell.  St. Paul, MN: 
West Publishing. 
 
Public Works Financing.  1998a.  “Long-Term Service 
Contracts Blossom,” (July/August). 
 
Public Works Financing.  1998b.  “Proposed Checklist 
for Federal Review of Long-term Wastewater 
Concession,” vol. 121 (September), p. 30. 
 
Public Works Financing.  1998c.  “Atlanta Gets 44% 
Savings on Water O&M,” (September). 
 
Raftelis, George A.  1993.  Comprehensive Guide to 
Water and Wastewater Finance and Pricing.  Ann 
Arbor, MI: Lewis Publishing. 
 
Savas, E.S.  1987.  Privatization: The Key to Better 
Government.  Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 
 
The Birmingham News.  1998.  “Water Profits to Fund 
New Schools, Upgrades,” (November 25). 
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  1997.  
Community Water System Survey: 1995.   
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
Vickers, John, and George Yarrow.  1991.  “Economic 
Perspectives on Privatization,” Economic 
Perspectives 5 (Spring). 
 
Wolf, Charles, Jr.  1991.  Markets or Governments: 
Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives.  





                                                          
1 Wolf (1991) stresses the importance of understanding 
of both market and nonmarket (government) failure. See 
also Vickers and Yarrow (1991). 
                                                                                           
2 Many resources are available on the available options, 
including publications by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and the U.S. General Accounting 
Office.   
3 On principal-agent theory, see Kettl (1993). 
4 On the importance of being a smart buyer, see Kettl 
(1993). 
5 The Atlanta contract, for example, provides for a 200 
percent payback penalty and numerous legal 
requirements for termination.  According to a United 
spokesman, by investing heavily to optimize operations 
during the first two years, United Water will quickly get 
to a point where it is too expensive for the city to 
terminate” (United Water Spokesman).  (Public Works 
Financing 1998c, p. 7) 
6 Savings from contracts often are used to reduce other 
municipal obligations and burdens.  In Birmingham, 
Alabama, for example, voters rejected a sale of the 
water system to fund much needed school renovations.  
An alternate plan involves borrowing funds to repay the 
water system’s debt and fund schools.  The debt would 
be repaid with “profits” from the water system; once the 
debt is repaid, the city can use the profits for other 
capital needs, including school construction and 
renovation.  (The Birmingham News 1998) 
7 Says Kettl (1993), “Despite the enthusiasm for 
entrepreneurial government and privatization, the most 
egregious tales of waste, fraud, and abuse in 
government programs have often involved greedy, 
corrupt, and often criminal activity by the government’s 
private partners – and weak government management to 
detect and correct these problems” (p. 5). 
8 On regulatory review of competitive and 
noncompetitive services, see Chessler (1996). 
9 The term “natural monopoly” should be avoided 
because monopolies exist in part because of policy 
institutions that create and maintain them. 
10 Water itself has no substitutes, only the quality of 
water and the method of delivery can vary. 
11 An off-the-record characterization of concession fees 
is that they constitute a form of legalized extortion. 
12 This unenviable challenge contrasts sharply with the 
energy and communications industries, where costs are 
stable or declining and demand continues to rise.  See 
Beecher (1998). 
13 Regulatory proceedings often require less time and 
resources than full-blown judicial proceedings. 
14 The capacity of evolving governments to regulate is a 
central issue in the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises.  See Kikeri, et al. (1992). 
 
 
